Abstract
Despite progress made over the past two decades, current international anti-corruption efforts continue to struggle with implementation issues in individual nations. The present study proposes an approach to anti-corruption policy implementation that considers the fight against public malfeasance in terms of its potential costs and benefits for political leadership. The existence of a political cycle for anti-corruption initiatives is proposed and tested through an examination of Peru’s National Anti-Corruption Commission from 2001 to 2005. The empirical analysis supports the theoretical tenets, showing how the government of President Toledo created and later devolved the anti-corruption commission due to private interests and political circumstances.
Highlights
Over the past two decades, an international anti-corruption movement has emerged with the shared understanding that malfeasance has negative implications for governance and development
Transfer to the Ministry of Justice The CNA was revisited through Supreme Decree No 035-2005-presidency of the Council of Ministers (PCM), signed on May 6, 2005. This second modification was brought about for a number of reasons, the most important being: (1) Toledo’s government was confronting its second-lowest level of popular support caused by a series of corruption scandals throughout the second half of 2004; (2) the UNCAC had been ratified by the Peruvian parliament on October 19, 2004; and (3) the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Peru and the Government of the United States regarding the transfer of confiscated assets, which saw the return of funds stolen during the Fujimori administration, demanded the setting of institutional arrangements to comply with the requirements included in the agreement
The political and symbolic nature of this office was sufficiently clear in the formal powers granted to it and the limited resources and support provided thereafter
Summary
The Political Cycle of Fighting Corruption: Peru’s Experience with its First National Anti-Corruption Commission. Despite progress made over the past two decades, current international anti-corruption efforts continue to struggle with implementation issues in individual nations. The present study proposes an approach to anti-corruption policy implementation that considers the fight against public malfeasance in terms of its potential costs and benefits for political leadership. The existence of a political cycle for anti-corruption initiatives is proposed and tested through an examination of Peru’s National Anti-Corruption Commission from 2001 to 2005. The empirical analysis supports the theoretical tenets, showing how the government of President Toledo created and later devolved the anti-corruption commission due to private interests and political circumstances
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