The Political Constraints on Economic Policy in Post‐1982 Mexico: The Case of Pemex

Abstract

Abstract Fourteen years of market‐oriented reform in Mexico have led to many economic changes. However during 1982–1994 there was relatively little change in the hydrocarbon sector. This article seeks to explain the slowness of reform essentially in political terms. While political constraints on reforming the hydrocarbons sector were genuine, it is also clear that the De la Madrid and Salinas governments chose to avoid controversial decisions in this sector as far as possible. Risk aversion seems, at least in this context, to have been a characteristic of Mexican authoritarianism during 1982–1994. Because of the inherent importance of the oil and gas sector to the Mexican economy, the slow growth of production since 1982 (largely resulting from extreme policy caution) provides a part of the explanation for the slow growth of the Mexican economy as a whole.