Abstract
Following the hostile bid for Société Générale in Belgium, companies have adopted ‘poison’ warrants as a means of deterring raiders. They appear to circumvent many important rules of Belgian takeover legislation. Cynthia Van Hulle and Koen Geens demonstrate that poison warrants would mainly benefit larger shareholders in companies subject to attack.
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