The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory

Abstract

HE positivistic reaction against philosophy has, in its effect on the social sciences, manifested a strong tendency to obscure the fact that man is essentially an active, creative, evaluating creature. Any attempt to explain his behavior in terms of ends, purposes, ideals, has been under suspicion as a form of teleology which was thought to be incompatible with the methodological requirements of positive science. One must, on the contrary, explain in terms of causes and conditions, not of ends. Of late years, however, there have been many signs of a break in this rigid positivistic view of things. The social sciences in general have been far from immune from these signs, and in sociology in particular they have combined to form a movement of thought of the first importance. One main aspect of this movement has been the tendency to reopen the whole question of the extent to which, and the senses in which, human behavior must or can be understood in terms of the values entertained by men. In the present essay I wish to attempt a formulation of the kind of conception of human action which I take to be implied in some of these recent developments of sociological theory. In particular, what is the status in that conception of the element which may provisionally be called ultimate values? I shall not attempt here to trace the process by which this conception of human action has been built up, but merely to outline the conception itself.'