Abstract
Despite the amount of commentary generated by the September 30th Movement in Indonesia, agreement beyond simple details of chronology may never be possible. The grisly drama began with the murder of six top army officers and a similar fate soon befell key leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The PKI's surviving remnant split into pro-Peking and pro-Moscow factions each apparently more interested in sectarian wrangling than an objective assessment of their common debacle. Nor can one expect the army to provide an impartial analysis. The legitimization of its new political role required placing the Gestapu albatross firmly around the PKI's neck. And perhaps the best stamp of army success in that endeavour is the almost reflexive resort by commentators to the label “abortive Communist coup”. But this does not imply that the prevailing perception of Gestapu as a failed Communist plot isprime faciediscredited because of its serviceability to Indonesia's present leadership. The army-cum-official version surely would not have gained such wide currency without something in its favour. It is the hope of the present article that additional light may be shed on this “something” through a comparative discussion of some representative views regarding Gestapu.
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