The Philosophy of Railways: The Transcontinental Railway Idea in British North America

Abstract

Reviewed by: The Philosophy of Railways: The Transcontinental Idea in British North America* Ken Cruikshank (bio) The Philosophy of Railways: The Transcontinental Idea in British North America. By A. A. den Otter. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997. Pp. 292; illustrations, maps, notes, index. $34.95. Canadian national historians, philosophers, poets, and folksingers have celebrated the construction of the Canadian Pacific railway as one of the great moments in Canadian history. The completion of the railway, they contend, drove the last spike into the hearts of covetous and expansionist Americans who sought to claim North America as their own, and ensured the creation of a kinder, gentler nation north of the forty-ninth parallel. In The Philosophy of Railways, historian A. A. den Otter punctures this national myth. From the 1840s onward, den Otter notes, Canadian political leaders were obsessed with railway technology, and gradually did become engaged by the idea of a transcontinental railway. More often than not, however, they were far more interested in attaching their communities to the dynamic economy and society to the south. More often than not, they welcomed American investment, American technology, American expertise, [End Page 427] and American railway connections. Den Otter concludes that Canadian railway projects, including the Canadian Pacific railway, need to be understood as the product of “a complex and ambiguous process that included metropolitan economic objectives, a civilizing mission, and political-economic theories of growth and development” (p. 11). Rather than portraying Canadian railway policy as the work of Canadian nation-builders, den Otter situates the policy within the context of “an international urban consensus on the place of technology in society” (p. 31). As a result, The Philosophy of Railways is a thoughtful study of the political and ideological context in which railway technology was introduced in the British North American colonies and the new Dominion of Canada. The book offers a welcome synthesis of new research by den Otter and other scholars, and also incorporates some very fine older works that often have been overlooked because they did not fit the “nationalist” interpretation of Canadian railway history. New light is shed on an old subject, particularly because den Otter is conversant with important international works such as Daniel Headrick’s influential Tentacles of Progress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). A range of research is thus made much more readily accessible and relevant to historians not directly involved in the field of Canadian railway history. The book begins with a consideration of the eighteenth-century liberal ideas that underpinned the philosophy of railways, and concludes with a wide-ranging discussion of the impact of Canadian railways by the time of World War I. The main focus of the work, however, is on the period between 1849, the eve of Canada’s first railway boom, and 1885, the completion of the Canadian Pacific railway. Den Otter avoids a central Canadian focus and is attentive to the development of railway policy in the Atlantic colonies. His most original contribution continues to be his work on the promotion of the Canadian Pacific. In this case, he is particularly careful to untangle the interaction of the public philosophy of railways and the private business strategies of railway promoters. This is perhaps the clearest and finest example in the book to show how attention to the public and private perspectives on the meaning and use of technology can alter traditional interpretations. Precisely because den Otter is at his best in bringing new perspectives to the study of railways, I was disappointed that some older ideas continue to shape his work. For example, den Otter insists on the connection between the National Policy tariffs and the need to create traffic for the future Canadian Pacific Railway. If this were the case, why is it that neither John A. Macdonald nor any of his other colleagues ever “explicitly tied the new tariff policy to the Pacific railway” (p. 204)? Perhaps because they knew that so long as Canada and the United States agreed to allow bonding-in-transit, customs tariffs would have little impact on the routing of traffic between eastern and western Canada. Den Otter downplays a more interesting connection between the philosophy...