Abstract

Despite attempts to create an atmosphere of command and confidence, the government of President Marcos condnued to reel in 1985 from the political and economic after-shocks of the August 1983 assassination of former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. The deterioration of confidence in the Marcos regime was underscored by a palpable cynicism over the conduct of the trial of mihtary personnel accused in the Aquino killing; by an increase in street demonstrations against the government; by renewed demands for political reforms such as fair and honest elections, a return to professionalism in the military, and a termination of the President's authoritarian powers under Amendment 6 of the 1973 Constitution; and by an increase in the size and the activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its mihtary arm, the New People's Army (NPA). A lack of faith in the Marcos government was likewise evident in the lengthy negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and foreign banks for new loans; in calls for the dismantling of the coconut and sugar monopolies controlled by close associates of the President; in stepped-up labour unrest; and in the regime's inability to stimulate new investment and to increase exports. Moreover, amid assessments that neither political reform nor economic recovery were likely as long as Marcos remained in power, the United States, which maintains a large mihtary presence in the country, expressed concern over the growth of the CPP/NPA and the continued slide of the economy, while the moderate democratic opposition, although still divided, made progress towards unity in anticipation of a snap presidential election in late 1985 or early 1986 and local elections in May 1986. On 3 November 1985, Marcos announced on American television a willingness to hold an early presidential election, and a few days later scheduled the poll for 7 February 1986. Predictions of Marcos' demise, however, proved to be premature, for by the end of 1985, having easily weathered an impeachment attempt by opposition parliamentarians in the Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly), Marcos appeared ? at least on the surface ? to be more in control of the destiny of the Philippines than a year earlier. But whether the appearance of control was real or illusory depends on the President's ability to revitalize the economy, curb the growing communist insurgency as well as prevent an upsurge of violence from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and achieve victory in the 1986 presidential and local elections. Trends in 1985 suggest that these obstacles pose a formidable, though not an insurmountable, challenge to Marcos' remaining the master of Philippine politics.

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