The perspectival nature of scientific representation

Abstract

AbstractThis chapter introduces the notion of perspectival representation with an analogy between art and science. It presents two varieties of perspectival representations in art. A representation can be said to be perspectival1 because the representation is from a specific vantage point and it is about the very vantage point from which the representation takes place. But a representation can also be said to be perspectival2 because it has a clear direction. It is towards one or more vanishing points and is not (self-referentially) about the vantage point from which the representation takes place. The chapter illustrates these two different ways of understanding perspectival representations with examples. Next it looks at a particular way in which perspectival representation has often been understood in philosophy of science as mainlyperspectival1. Namely, it has often been suggested that the vantage point from which the representation is drawn affects the content. For example, one can think of different scientific models as predicating different and incompatible properties of the same target system (via the notion of representing-as). A problem arises out of this widespread perspectival1 way of thinking about representation in science. Realism about science seems to be jeopardized when there are multiple models for the same target system that are deemed to represent-it-as x or y or z, where x, y, and z are incompatible properties. The problem is genuinely epistemic and cannot be eschewed by appealing to pragmatic factors, namely by invoking the use that epistemic agents make of perspectival1 representations for various purposes.