Abstract
This article attempts to explain the persistence and adaptability of Vietnam’s political system that has been described in the conventional literature as an oppressive and a nonresponsive political regime. The analysis, supported by two case studies, shows that the regime may have survived and buttressed its grip on power because it has relied on both coercion and consent, which allowed the regime to flexibly adapt to real‐life politics; to avoid and minimize conflict between state and society; and to suppress any challenge to its power emerging from the civil society . The article finally observes that the future survival of the regime depends on how the ruling party fixes its inherent “system fault” and sustains public trust.
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