Abstract
Abstract ‘Dogmatism’ is a term renovated by James Pryor (2000) to stand for a certain kind of neo-Moorean response to scepticism and an associated conception of the architecture of basic perceptual warrant. Pryor runs the response only for (some kinds of ) perceptual knowledge but here I will be concerned with its general structure and potential as a possible global anti-sceptical strategy. Something like it is arguably also present in recent writings of Burge and Peacocke. If the global strategy could succeed, it would pre-empt any role in the diagnosis and treatment of sceptical paradoxes for the kind of notion of entitlement (rational, nonevidential warrant) I have proposed elsewhere (Wright 2004). But my overarching contention will be that dogmatism is, generally and locally, too problematic a stance to be helpful in that project.
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