Abstract
This paper studies the effects of making employee performance information public within an organization. We analyze the behavior of the employees of a bank that, in 2005, decided to make ranking performance in a tournament available to all employees. We find that, consistent with there being a shame effect, lower ranked employees exert higher effort in order to avoid the stigma of everyone learning their low performance. We also show that the shame effect is mediated by the age of the worker consistent with the presence of career concerns. Likewise, the incentive effect also seems to be stronger for more educated workers. Finally, contrary to previous findings in laboratory experiments we do not find any evidence of women showing a differential response to the introduction of publicity.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
