The Perfect Island

Abstract

There is an objection to the Ontological Argument which is almost as old as the argument itself. In his critique of St. Anselm's Proslogion, Gaunilo claims that by using the same argument that Anselm uses to prove the existence of God, one can prove the existence of a perfect island.' Gaunilo evidently intends his objection to be a kind of reductio by counter-argument: Anselm's argument, if it worked, would admit into existence all sorts of perfect things which we all know do not exist. Thus there is something wrong with Anselm's argument. Anselm did not say much by way of reply to Gaunilo. In this paper I shall offer a defence of Anselm. I shall argue that whatever other faults his version of the Ontological Argument may have, it does not let a host of perfect things into existence.