Abstract
Senator J. William Fulbright remains best known for the international exchange program that he started, but for thirteen years of his congressional career, he also was a crusader against the Pentagon's “propaganda machine.” This article documents and analyses his challenge to the Defense Department's domestic use of “mental munitions” and “opinion ops” from 1961 to 1974, contextualizing events within a broader history of congressional opposition to executive propaganda. It provides evidence that he lost his immediate political, intellectual, and his philosophical battle against the Pentagon's public relations apparatus. Nevertheless he may have contributed to the rise of scholarly criticism of government's coequal participation in the marketplace of ideas as well as to criticism that assumptions associated with the marketplace of ideas are faulty.
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