Abstract
A dynamic normal formulation for differential games is introduced and the "pedestrian principle" is discussed as a means of dynamically implementing the equilibrium strategy in a single game. Our formulation emphasizes the distinction between a player's rational prediction and the actual evolution of the game dynamics. To model the free will of players, a randomized strategy is introduced which serves as the justification of mixed strategies and the bridge from a static analysis to a dynamic one. Existence of Nash equilibrium in the class of mixed strategies is proved for non-cooperative deterministic differential games.
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