The Peaceful Transfer of Power and the Social Contract

Abstract

The potential breakdown of political order stresses the importance of strategic challenges that surface during transitions of power. To understand these challenges, I take a social contract perspective, developing a theoretical framework that highlights the strategic incentives underlying political sovereignty. I show that the stability of political order essentially requires a ruler to consent to her own removal, giving rise to a key incentive condition—the sovereignty constraint. Analysis of the sovereignty constraint uncovers a trade-off between political order and economic inequality and identifies the socioeconomic conditions that are necessary for stable political order. The analysis identifies two necessary forces, the threat of rebellion and economic subversion, which together curb a ruler’s predatory temptations. By extending the model, I show how transitional justice effects both necessary conditions, leading to deterrent and strategic effects, which illustrate how interventions aiming to improve stability may work in some instances but backfire in others.