The PBR theorem: Whose side is it on?

Abstract

This paper examines the implications of the PBR theorem for the debate on the reality of the quantum state. The theorem seeks to undermine epistemic interpretations of the quantum state and support realist interpretations thereof, but there remains ambiguity about the precise nature of epistemic interpretations, and thus ambiguity about the implications of the theorem. The aim of this paper is to examine a radical epistemic interpretation that is not undermined by the theorem and is, arguably, strengthened by it. It is this radical interpretation, rather than the one assumed by the PBR theorem, that many epistemic theorists subscribe to. In order to distinguish the radical epistemic interpretation from alternative interpretations of quantum states--in particular, to distinguish it from instrumentalism--a historical comparison of different approaches to the meaning of quantum probabilities is provided. The comparison highlights, in particular, Schrödinger's work on the nature of quantum probabilities as distinct from probabilities in statistical mechanics, and the implications of this distinction for an epistemic interpretation of probability in the two areas. Schrödinger's work also helps to identify the difficulties in the PBR definition of an epistemic interpretation and is shown to anticipate the radical alternative that is not undermined by the theorem.