The Past is a Foreign Country -- Understanding the British Approach to Counterinsurgency

Abstract

Abstract : This monograph examines why the performance of the British Army in Iraq between 2003-2009 failed to match pre-war expectations. It does so through an examination of the sources of the excellent reputation for proficiency in counterinsurgency operations enjoyed by the British Army in 2003. It suggests that this reputation was in part based on the successes enjoyed by the British Army during the process of dismantling the British Empire. It goes on to suggest that the British Army's corporate memory had failed to retain an understanding of the techniques used during these campaigns. Instead, the monograph argues, the British Army by 2003 had an understanding of the British approach to counterinsurgency that was based on a combination of a sanitized narrative and a faulty model. The monograph concludes by suggesting that a deeper understanding of the essentially repressive nature of the British Empire needs to be developed by the British Army and incorporated into its cognitive processes if British performance is to be improved in the future.