Abstract

In April 2015, the Australian Government passed the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act, which imposes obligations on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to collect metadata information about their users and store this metadata for a period of two years. This article reviews the operation of the Act and considers the extent to which it conflicts with the human right to privacy. We suggest that the broad scope of the data retention obligations and the lack of judicial safeguards to limit access to collected data presents a clear conflict with the requirements of international law. From its conception through to its ongoing implementation, Australia’s data retention scheme has been controversial. The Government has generally asserted that data retention is necessary to further Australia’s national security interests and to assist law enforcement agencies with criminal investigations. In the face of criticism, however, Government officials have been notably unable to justify the scheme on these grounds, or to show that data retention is a proportionate response to national security and law enforcement concerns. The passage of data retention in Australia is particularly notable for the significant confusion not only over what the scheme would achieve, but what it would actually do. The Data Retention Act does not clearly explain what constitutes “metadata” for the purposes of the Act, nor, famously, was the Attorney-General George Brandis able to define metadata when asked about it. This is part of a broader narrative of disagreement and confusion about what data is suitable for collection and how data collection can impact upon the privacy interests of Australian citizens. We examine how public interest concerns were dealt with during the passage of the Act as reflected in Australian news media. While the Act was controversial and subject to substantial ongoing criticism, the Government ultimately did little to address the human rights concerns that had been raised. The Act was ultimately passed with bi-partisan support, despite severe deficiencies in the justifications, a lack of clarity in the operation of the scheme, and heated public opposition from a small but vocal group of advocates. We show how the complexity of the Act appeared to limit engaged critique in the mainstream media, and how escalating fears over domestic and international terrorist attacks were exploited to secure the Act’s passage through federal Parliament.

Highlights

  • This paper is part of Australian internet policy, a special issue of Internet Policy Review guestedited by Angela Daly and Julian Thomas

  • We argue that the government has not discharged its burden of showing that Australia’s data retention obligation is a necessary measure, and that it has not been appropriately tailored to satisfy the requirements of proportionality

  • The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act was passed by the Australian government in April 2015, and is due to be reviewed by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) sometime in 2019 (s 187N)

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Summary

PART I: THE DATA RETENTION ACT

In April 2015, the Australian government passed the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act, which requires Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and telecommunications providers to store information about their subscribers’ online activity for a period of two years. Experience from other jurisdictions and the recommendations of Australian reviews suggest that mass data retention obligations can only be justified if they are clearly necessary and curtailed to limit access to data for the purposes of addressing serious crimes with full judicial oversight. The larger-scale concerns about the necessity of introducing mass-scale surveillance obligations or the scheme's uncertain scope, vague specification of access rights, and limited judicial oversight, were not well represented in the media. Many of the issues raised during the passage of the act were effectively deferred to be resolved at a future date, either by a review committee or through ministerial regulations, giving the government the time it needed to secure bipartisan support for its passage

PART II: NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE
SCOPE OF OBLIGATIONS
ACCESS TO METADATA
HUMAN RIGHTS SAFEGUARDS
PART III: THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS
CONTENT AND METADATA
NECESSITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY JUSTIFICATIONS
COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY
CONCLUSION
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