Abstract
Does variation in the party system explain variation in legislator cohesion? Exiting theory on the forces that drive legislative cohesion argues, in part, that legislators follow the party line in order to aid their reelection chances. If true, then variation in the competitiveness and institutionalization of the party should lead to variation in legislator cohesion. Using data from the U.S. House of Representatives during the First Party Systems, I show that U.S. House members differed in the levels of cohesion based on differences in the party system across their districts.
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