The partner market as a resource in couples' bargaining on housework division

Abstract

AbstractObjectiveThis study analyzes whether the relative partner market position is a resource of power in couples' bargaining on the division of housework.BackgroundMany studies explain men's persistently low housework contributions by their stronger relative economic resources in couples' exchanges. This article argues that a relatively higher number of alternative potential partners may act as an additional resource in this exchange because it affects the threat point of the bargaining process.MethodDyadic data from the German Family Panel (pairfam) are combined with partner market indicators from the project titled “The macrostructural context of the partner market: longitudinal dynamics” to estimate the effect of the relative partner market position on the division of housework by couples.ResultsA more favorable supply of potential partners to one partner than to the other corresponds to his/her lower housework contributions. However, a good relative partner market position is valuable for an individual's bargaining position only when he/she is also economically more attractive on the partner market than his/her partner.ConclusionThe findings demonstrate the relevance of the partner market for dyadic processes in couple relationships and support resource bargaining approaches.ImplicationsThe exogenous impact of the partner market on housework arrangements implies that the empirically observed association between partner market imbalances and relationship stability are not mere products of endogeneity but represent real impacts of the partner market.