THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGN OF MARCUS LICINIUS CRASSUS

Abstract

The article proves that Mark Licinius Crassus is fully responsible for the defeat in the Parthian campaign. The mistake was the very decision about the Parthian campaign. Apparently, the only motive of Crassus was to get a great victory in order to compare military glory with Caesar and Pompey. In the summer of 54 BC Crassus crossed the Euphrates and invaded Northern Mesopotamia, which was controlled by Parthia. At first his action was successful. The Romans took control of a number of cities without a fight. But Crassus did not cement his success and led the army to winter quarters in Syria. The decision proved costly as it gave time to the king of Parthia to prepare for the subsequent struggle.On the contrary, Crassus did not prepare his army for a subsequent war. He wasted his winter, collecting money from nearby territories. After that, the king of Parthia ceased to respect him as a commander. The new campaign of the Romans began in the spring of 53 BC by seven legions and almost four thousand horsemen. He crossed the Euphrates without encountering resistance from Parthians and misinterpreted the data obtained by his scouts. He chose the worst option for continuing the campaign against the advice of his commanders. The way the Romans were moving was extremely difficult: deep sand, lack of water and vegetation. The enemy managed to entice the Romans into the territory, which was very favorable for the action of the Parthian cavalry. Another time Crassus made a wrong decision to attack the enemy immediately, not allowing his soldiers to rest. Not surprisingly, the battle ended in the complete defeat of the Romans. The subsequent actions of Crassus were not well thought out and led the Roman army to a logical catastrophe.It is established that Crassus trusted the advice of those who were indifferent to the interests of Rome and did not trust his commanders. He did not only fail to use the resources of his allies but he also repelled them by his actions. It is proved that at critical moments, Marcus Crassus lost control of the situation, did not lead the army, and in taking decisions he had been pressured by the legionnaires.