Abstract
Legal paternalism occurs when the law forces individuals to avoid certain risks (‘hard paternalism’), or, without coercion, nudges them away from such risks (‘soft paternalism’), on the ground that otherwise they will make unwise decisions. The questions when and how such approaches should be taken are of fundamental importance in a society in which there are increasing risks to health and livelihood resulting from technological developments and greater freedom of choice. However they are not openly addressed in policy-making circles and have also been neglected in the European legal literature. In this paper, I attempt to explain these paradoxes and to outline a theoretical benefit-cost framework for determining when and how legal paternalism might be considered appropriate.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
