The paradox of public bureaucracies:Discriminatory bureaucrats in non-discriminatory bureaucracies

Abstract

Bureaucracies are expected to treat customers equally and are assumed to attract people with a high Public Service Motivation (PSM). While PSM has positive effects on individual and organizational performance, a growing body of literature points out that PSM might also entail darker sides which so far have not been empirically scrutinized in detail. This article demonstrates the fundamental paradox of modern bureaucracies: People with high levels of PSM are especially vulnerable towards pro-social rule-breaking (PSRB) behavior which ultimately leads to discriminatory behavior threatening the very foundations of the bureaucratic principle. We test our theory by conducting an original vignette-based experiment replicated in three countries (Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands) with 1,239 observations in total. Our findings provide first behavioral evidence on the linear relationship between PSM and the likelihood of PSRB. Furthermore, results reveal that the relation between PSM and PSRB is moderated asymmetrically by client-based information cues: Negative cues have a larger negative effect than positive cues have a positive effect. This means that high-PSM people are not only more likely to engage in PSRB but that they also discriminate more sharply between clients that they perceive to be more deserving than their low-PSM peers. Furthermore, findings reveal that respondents abusing their discretion in this way were fully aware of the harming effect towards the organization while the benefit for the customer appeared to be a less significant motivation. In summary, this study provides evidence for a fundamental behavioral paradox at the core of modern bureaucracies and adds substantially to the literature on the dark sides of PSM, which are more diverse and have larger impact than anticipated so far.