Abstract
Abstract The green credit policy has made remarkable achievements in energy saving, emission reduction and industrial structure optimization, however, due to the collusion between enterprises and local government, a huge gap exists between the reality and expectation in the process of policy execution. The collusion is the result of cooperative game through Nash bargaining. Banks, as agents in carrying out the green credit policy, offer preferential interest rate that influences the collusion. This paper analyzes the collusion and factors affecting its incidence on the bas is of constructing the expected profit functions of both the enterprise and the local government. Meanwhile, we obtain the optimal volume of loans and offer several relevant suggestions for policy.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
