The Paradox of Exploitation

Benjamin Ferguson

doi:10.1007/s10670-015-9776-4

Abstract

The concept of exploitation brings many of our ordinary moral intuitions into conflict. Exploitation—or to use the commonly accepted ordinary language definition, taking unfair advantage—is often thought to be morally impermissible. In order to be permissible, transactions must not be unfair. The claim that engaging in mutually beneficial transactions is morally better than not transacting is also quite compelling. However, when combined with the claim that morally permissible transactions are better than impermissible transactions, these three imply the counterintuitive claim that it is obligatory to engage in mutually beneficial transactions. In this paper I outline the conditions that comprise this ‘paradox of exploitation’ along with a solution that involves replacing one of the original conditions with a condition I call Weak Non-worseness. The solution captures the priority of our concerns about exploitation by making a concern for the fairness of a transaction subsidiary to a concern for the welfare of the would-be exploited.

Highlights

The concept of exploitation brings many of our ordinary moral intuitions into conflict
The first—captured by Pareto Permissibility— is the idea that strict Pareto improvement and consent were jointly sufficient for a transaction to be permissible
The second—captured by Moral Impermissibility— denies that strict Pareto and consent are jointly sufficient for permissible transaction

Summary

The Initial Tension

When someone steals my wallet, they take it without consent and make me worse off than I was. Similar to Pareto Permissibility, Non-worseness does not conflict with Necessary Fairness It allows that transactions can be strictly Pareto improving and consensual, yet impermissible because unfair. Fairness and Non-worseness is an attractive resolution of the initial tension because this approach captures the idea that there is something good about Pareto improving, consensual transactions—they are better than not transacting—and yet, it is consistent with the intuition that some of these transactions, though better than not transacting, may be impermissible. Both conditions lie at the heart of our thinking about cases of exploitation. Though Necessary Fairness and Non-worseness are individually compelling, jointly satisfiable, and essential to our thinking about exploitation, when combined with two compelling additional claims they generate a paradox

The Paradox

Evaluating the Conditions

Resolving the Paradox

Findings

Conclusion