The paradox of deterministic probabilities

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper aims to investigate the so-called paradox of deterministic probabilities: in a deterministic world, all probabilities should be subjective; however, they also seem to play important explanatory and predictive roles which suggest they are objective. The problem is then to understand what these deterministic probabilities are. Recent proposed solutions of this paradox are the Mentaculus vision, the range account of probability and a version of frequentism based on typicality. All these approaches aim at defining deterministic objective probabilities as to make them compatible with determinism. In this paper, I argue that one can think of the equivalent of subjective and objective deterministic probabilities in terms of typicality. Also, I show that only what I identify with objective probabilities plays the necessary explanatory and predictive roles, while the subjective components essentially guide beliefs. In this way, the paradox is solved.