The Papers of George Washington. Presidential Series, Volume 9: September 1791-February 1792

Abstract

BOOK REVIEWS The Papers of George Washington. Presidential Series, Volume 9: September 1791-February 1792. Edited by Mark A. Mastromarino and Jack D. Warren. Philander D. Chase, Series Editor. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000. Pp. xxxiv, 672. $62.50.) The Presidential Series of Papers of George Washington form one section of partially completed seven-unit, forty-six-volume compilation of documents produced by, or sent to, America's most famous person. Volume 9 addresses six critical months in Washington administration, from September 1791 to February 1792. Some of issues president faced included controversies in developing new federal capital; nomination of ministers to London, Paris, and The Hague; and government's decision on sending weapons to help suppress slave uprising on Saint Domingue. Above all, event that shook United States during this period was virtual annihilation of its army on November 4, 1791, at hands of First Nations of Old Northwest. For this reviewer that last event is most interesting story that can be followed through volume because of its place in larger struggles for control of Great Lakes between 1754 and 1814. This volume offers a variety of enlightening correspondence for weeks leading up to aboriginal victory, such as a letter from Secretary of War Henry Knox that summarized ambivalent thoughts of expedition's commander, Arthur St. Clair, on his prospects for looming confrontation. Another fascinating document is a report on diplomatic dance then taking place among Americans, Six Nations Iroquois, and British to protect their differing interests as they awaited outcome of approaching confrontation between Western Tribes and United States. These are followed by first reports of St. Clair's disaster, which arrived in capital on December 8, 1791. Of these, that of one battalion commander, William Darke, is particularly interesting. Darke conveyed a vivid sense of confused desperation that marked action and made a not-atypical attempt to exonerate his own performance and that of his fellow officers by shifting most of blame for rout to panic-struck lower ranks, who, he wrote, could not be brought into line to perform their duty. Darke also noted that he thought the Slaughter far Grater than Bradocks (163), an interesting observation given American fondness for remembering 1755 British defeat on Monongahela but not American one on Wabash, perhaps because former affirms national myths while latter threatens them. Once news of disaster tore through capital, politicians leapt into action to promote their respective agendas. Washington's first report to House of Representatives calmly referred to the misfortune which has befallen troops and, while admitting that loss of life was considerable, quickly moved on to state that it may be repaired without great difficulty (274). These sentiments, of course, were expressed without his being certain that Congress would allow him to raise a new army and without having enough details at hand to assess magnitude of frontier crisis with any precision. The coolness of Washington's public statement also contrasted with his angry private outburst to news of defeat as witnessed at one of Martha Washington's weekly receptions (275). By Christmas, his administration had developed plans to replace lost army and attempted to undermine politicians who argued for a peaceful settlement by asserting that hostilities were necessary because aboriginal people not only had rejected government offers to promote peace upon terms of justice and humanity (314) but had fallen under machinations of malignant and turbulent characters (317) who stoked their desires for plunder and trophies (320). …