Abstract
This article examines the peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations (UN) Palestine Commission, which was charged with implementing the General Assembly’s Resolution 181 on the partition of Palestine between January and May 1948. First, I argue here that the marginalization of the Commission in past literature is unjustified. Its very ineffectiveness in real time made it an important analytical case study in retrospect, elucidating the obstacles that prevented the fulfilment of the Partition Plan and exemplifying the general UN retreat from Resolution 181 shortly after its adoption. Second, the critique levied against the personal/professional abilities of its delegates by some of its contemporaries seems exaggerated; more important were the external, insurmountable problems the Commission faced, which would have likely overwhelmed even the best of diplomats.
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