The Paasikivi Line in Finland's Foreign Policy

Abstract

OLLOWING WORLD WAR II, Finland's foreign policy toward the Soviet Union has consistently followed the so-called Paasikivi Line. This policy deserves investigation for its approach to the Soviet and for its possible contribution to East-West relations generally, since the Kremlin leaders have apparently accepted it as a satisfactory arrangement for coexistence with an independent, non-Communist nation with which Russia shares some seven hundred miles of border. It is the purpose of this article to explore the concepts and measures underlying the Finnish policy and to evaluate their significance. The Paasikivi Line is compounded from the views and diplomatic practices of its conservatively-oriented author, the late Juho K. Paasikivi Prime Minister, 1944-46, and President, 1946-56 and his successor, the Agrarian party leader Urho Kekkonen Prime Minister on five occasions between 1950 and 1956 and President since 1956.1 Paasikivi's beliefs in rapprochement with Russia had been consistently held for nearly a halfcentury before he became responsible for Finland's policies after the armistice of 1944. Kekkonen's conversion from anti-Russian views occurred during the Continuation War, 1941-44, although he had advocated moderation in policy as early as 1937.2 The Paasikivi Line is based on the assumption that the Soviet Union's interest in Finland is pre-eminently a security interest and that occupation and satellization are not necessary to ensure achievement of this objective. It holds that if Finland initiates friendly and co-operative measures to convince her neighbor that hostile actions by her, or even through her territory, will henceforth be prevented, the Soviet will in turn co-operate to the extent of accepting Finland's independence and its freedom of choice in other respects, including the conduct of its own internal affairs and those aspects of its external relations which do not affect the Soviet Union's strategic interests. This case is based partially on historical evidence of