The Outlook for Thailand

Abstract

T HAILAND IS a nation running on its own timetable. In contrast to the pre-World War II era, however, Thailand is no longer isolated. In one of several ways in which they can be compared with the Japanese, the Thais in recent years have easily adapted to new ways while keeping their old traditions. But inevitable exposure to the outside world, especially through an American connection never fully accepted by either side, has contributed to the dilemma confronting Thailand today. That dilemma can be simply stated. If Thailand continues with rapid political and economic modernization, it runs the risk of rending the social fabric that has held the nation together for centuries. But if, on the other hand, Thailand relies on this outdated and inevitably oppressive social order for national survival, it runs the risk of breaking apart and falling prey to the disciplined Communist order gnawing at its extremities. The situation is a little like Spain, in an Asian setting. Change in Thailand could hardly be held back after the successful, palace-backed student rebellion of October 1973, any more than it could be in Spain after the death of Franco. But the police and military power in Thailand, as in Spain, remains in the hands of feudal elements created by the ancien rigime. These elements reasserted themselves in Thailand in the military coup of October 1976. They established a government that does not appear to go all the way back to former military dictatorships, however, and that claims to have put Thailand on a more roundabout but surer path toward liberalization than the one chosen by its democratically-elected predecessor. Thailand's ability--or inability-to maintain its balance internally and externally will determine whether it ultimately conforms to some Western expectations and behaves like a domino. There is no good