The other space race: Eisenhower and the quest for aerospace security

Abstract

The Other Eisenhower and the Quest for Aerospace Security Nicholas Michael Sambaluk, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2015, 316 pages [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] The Other is fascinating look at the early years (1954-1961) of the celebrated Space Race between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is full of fascinating sidebars fleshing out the context of the times in vivid detail and peaking with the lunar landing in 1969. Regrettably, until now, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's role has received rather superficial treatment in this race saga. Many mistakenly derided his administration as being caught off guard by the Sputnik launches and supposedly playing mere catch-up. However, The Other highlights an important reality: Eisenhower was far more programmatic in his approach to space and more intimately involved in the strategic policy-level decision making than is generally acknowledged. Much of this oversight is understood through the lens of his leadership style. Historian Stephen Ambrose, an Eisenhower biographer, noted that Ike had gotten through many a crisis simply by denying that a crisis existed In the aftermath of Sputnik, his usual resort to calmness failed to quell the uproar, but his ability to shape the direction of U.S. space exploration would influence policymaking thereafter. The book is much more than an account of Eisenhower's personal involvement. The inherent tension is clearly exposed between Ike's desire to use space as a window into Soviet capabilities to prevent misperception and worst-case thinking--quite possibly leading to nuclear Armageddon--and the Air Force's contrarian approach foreseeing space weaponization as inevitable. A newly independent, brash Air Force viewed itself as the vanguard of American defense in a future dominated by spiraling technological feats where second place--so its leaders argued--would consign the Nation to certain doom against a relentless Communist foe intent on domination. Sambaluk unambiguously illuminates how disconnected Air Force senior-leader thinking was from the strategic initiatives Eisenhower was trying to crystallize at the dawn of a new frontier. A clear example of these competing philosophies regarding how best to achieve space security was the project. A focal point throughout the book, it was a piloted, reusable, boost-glide spacecraft that launched like a rocket and recovered by landing like an unpowered glider. To supporters, Dyna-Soar would enable the United States to control the ultimate high ground. To detractors, the project was an overly ambitious fantasy given the state of many necessary supporting technologies, was fiscally irresponsible during a recession, and jeopardized the peaceful methods Eisenhower was keen on pursuing to keep a lid on competition and expenditures. In a telling comment, Sambaluk has a bit of fun noting Dyna-Soar would eventually go the way of the dinosaur, but acknowledges that in 1957, in the hysteria following Sputnik, it seemed quite possible that it would go from concept to creation, with all that entailed. Sambaluk lucidly explains Ike felt that the superior American space technologies could pierce the seemingly opaque Soviet military system. He was supremely confident satellites, once operational, would expose the so-called bomber gap and missile gap as gross distortions of reality, derailing agendas demanding ever greater spending on yet more weapons of war--or so he thought. Eisenhower's Open Skies initiative sought tangible verification of capabilities through routine, unencumbered space overflights; however, Khrushchev, suspicious of sinister designs, thwarted the proposal. Of course, once Sputnik was aloft and transmitting, overflight became a nonissue and actually facilitated Eisenhower's goal, since Sputnik's successive orbits set a precedent by default when the United States did nothing to hinder its path. …