The Other Side of COIN

Abstract

Abstract : Throughout its history, The United States has fought insurgencies. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries these insurgencies were primarily waged internally, first for independence, then for States' rights, and then by North American tribes as a result of the Monroe Doctrine and westward expansionism. During the end of the nineteenth and the entire twentieth century, as the US extended its hegemonic tendrils, it faced classic insurgencies in nations around the world such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and El Salvador. As a result the US developed counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies. But these COIN strategies, much like the US strategies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, were focused, for the most part, on military operations and largely ignored the other elements of power in successfully defeating insurgencies. Due to the complexity of twenty-first century insurgencies, it is time to fully engage and integrate all US agencies in the COIN effort in order to ensure that the other elements of power are effectively and decisively engaged in defeating the global insurgency that the US and its allies face today and will face in the future. Rather than having the lead in COIN, the military should be an equal partner to the diplomatic, informational and economic elements of power.