Abstract
Abstract When brokers, analysts, and fund managers buy or sell stocks for their own accounts, these “access employees” of financial institutions outperform retail investors over short windows up to a month. They earn particularly high abnormal returns when they trade before earnings announcements, revisions of analyst recommendations, and large stock price changes. We also find evidence consistent with profitable front-running and information leakage around the execution of corporate insider trades and block trades by mutual funds, as well as the release of revised recommendations by analysts who work at the same brokerage firm. (JEL G12, G14, G18) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
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