The Other Dark Side of Pro-Government Militias: Deterring Nonviolent Action and Spoiling Prospects for Peace During Civil Wars

Does the military strength of rebel movements affect conflict-related sexual violence by pro-government militias (PGMs)? Existing studies on PGMs show the significant role that PGMs can have in shaping conflict dynamics and outcomes. What remains understudied is how the variation in power capabilities between conflict actors and the sources of support for PGMs influences civilian victimization by militia groups. We argue that strong rebels tip the balance of power against the state, making the state more susceptible to authorizing or allowing sexual violence by PGMs. In addition, the level of autonomy of PGMs from the government is likely to influence their sexual violence, conditional on rebel strength. When rebels are militarily strong, states are likely to order or tolerate sexual violence by PGMs that they train and/or provide resources to, thereby resulting in sexual violence by state-dependent PGMs. Examining all civil conflicts from 1989 to 2009 and using newly collected data on state-dependence of PGMs, our empirical findings provide evidence that PGMs are associated with higher levels of conflict-related sexual violence when the government faces strong rebels. Results also show that the likelihood of sexual violence by state-dependent PGMs increases when rebels exhibit strong military capabilities.

It has long been understood that pro-government militia activity and pro-government militia violence increase during civil war. Recent literature contends that pro-government militia activity also rises when a state is involved in an interstate rivalry. We maintain that the combination of these two threats may, somewhat counterintuitively, result in reduced pro-government militia activity in some autocracies. This unexpected outcome can be explained by differences in state capacity and legitimacy. Using Geddes’ categorization of authoritarian regimes, we expect a decline in the number of operational pro-government militias when personalist and military regimes are challenged by both an insurgency and a rivalry. Pro-government militia liabilities are magnified in this context and add to these governments’ already considerable cumulative hazards. Pro-government militia numbers will, in contrast, remain consistent in single party regimes in this same circumstance. Since party governments have ample capacity, well-known disadvantages of pro-government militias rarely pose a threat to these capable regimes. In a sample of 142 autocracies from 1981 to 2010, we find considerable empirical support for our contention.

Why do governments choose to fund pro-government militias (PGMs) if doing so could extend costly civil conflict? While PGMs are active in a majority of civil wars, their impact on conflict termination remains poorly understood. We argue that the choice to fund PGMs is a strategic one for states and part of their efforts to influence wartime dynamics and conflict termination. We hypothesize that PGMs’ impact on conflict termination is conditional on whether they are government funded. Government-funded PGMs help states to ward off costly negotiations and encourage the rebellion's gradual dissolution. Using competing risks analyses on civil wars ending between 1981 and 2007, we find robust evidence that PGM funding affects conflict outcomes.

In recent years, the relations between weak central governments and armed groups in the periphery have attracted great attention. Rebels, warlords and other actors have not only undermined the authorities' grip on power, but gradually come to shape the nature of governance and political system in their countries. Warlordism, rebelocracies and aliocracies are just a few of the political systems identified by students of conflict and armed groups. However, the literature has generally overlooked one category of armed groups and their implications on political order: pro-government militias (PGMs). As PGMs have become ubiquitous in civil wars, this article identifies a new political order emerging in countries where central governments have become reliant on PGMs in counter-insurgency operations. The article defines this order as a militiatocracy. Unlike armed groups in other political orders, PGMs do not seek to overthrow, undermine or replace the central government. Instead, in militiatocracies, PGMs and central governments develop symbiotic relations, which on the one hand help the government to survive an insurgency, but on the other allow militia leaders to secure an increasing presence in politics. The article illustrates the emergence and nature of militiatocracies by employing the case of Syria during the civil war.

Previous research on non-state actors involved in civil wars has tended to disregard the role of extra-dyad agents in influencing conflict outcomes. Little is known as to whether the presence of such extra-dyadic actors as pro-regime militias affects conflict termination and outcomes. This article develops and tests a number of hypotheses on the pro-government militias’ effect upon civil war outcomes. It proposes that pro-regime militias involved in intrastate conflicts tend to act as proponents of ‘no peace, no war’, favouring low-activity violence and ceasefires over other conflict outcomes. These hypotheses are examined using an expanded dataset on pro-government militias and armed conflict in a statistical analysis of 229 civil war episodes from 1991 to 2015. These findings shed new light on the role of extra-state actors in civil wars.

It is typically argued that civil war acutely inhibits inward flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). However, the evidence is inconsistent and does not support the assumed negative relationship between civil war and FDI. Some studies suggest that FDI enters countries with internal armed conflicts unabated; others show that civil war economies exhibit strong increases in FDI during conflict. Underpinned by a liberal interpretation of war, this scholarship finds these trends to be surprising, counter-intuitive and curious, arguing that FDI enters conflict zones in spite of violence. In contrast, critical perspectives can provide insights by acknowledging that violence can facilitate economic processes such as FDI, creating a particular form of security and stability that can be conducive to FDI inflows. This article examines the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), a country which exhibited strong increases in FDI during phases of the conflict. It is argued that particular types of violence perpetrated by the government’s armed forces and pro-government militias – groups which were sympathetic to the interests of key investors in the oil industry – facilitated FDI in Sudan’s oil sector during the 2000s to the detriment of large sections of the civilian population affected by the violence.

This study investigates how deployment of pro-government militias (PGMs) as counterinsurgents affects the risk of conflict recurrence. Militiamen derive material and non-material benefits from fighting in armed conflicts. Since these will likely have diminished after the conflict’s termination, militiamen develop a strong incentive to spoil post-conflict peace. Members of pro-government militias are particularly disadvantaged in post-conflict contexts compared to their role in the government’s counterinsurgency campaign. First, PGMs are usually not present in peace negotiations between rebels and governments. This reduces their commitment to peace agreements. Second, disarmament and reintegration programs tend to exclude PGMs, which lowers their expected and real benefits from peace. Third, PGMs might lose their advantage of pursuing personal interests while being protected by the government, as they become less essential during peacetimes. To empirically test whether conflicts with PGMs as counterinsurgents are more likely to break out again, we identify PGM counterinsurgent activities in conflict episodes between 1981 and 2007. We code whether the same PGM was active in a subsequent conflict between the same actors. Controlling for conflict types, which is associated with both the likelihood of deploying PGMs and the risk of conflict recurrence, we investigate our claims with propensity score matching, statistical simulation, and logistic regression models. The results support our expectation that conflicts in which pro-government militias were used as counterinsurgents are more likely to recur. Our study contributes to an improved understanding of the long-term consequences of employing PGMs as counterinsurgents and highlights the importance of considering non-state actors when crafting peace and evaluating the risk of renewed violence.

Along with Iraqi security forces, pro-government militias, known as Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF, also “Hashd al-Shaabi” in Arabic), played a significant role in defeating ISIS. Iraq's engagement with these armed groups during the fight against ISIS empowered and legitimised them within the country. Yet, they often committed human rights violations and were involved in violent activities against the United States embassy, personnel, and military bases. However, since 2014, these groups have been acting as pro-government militias and are legally part of the Iraqi security forces. Yet, some of them have declared loyalty to Iran and act as proxy forces for Tehran. This article argues that pro-government militias in post-ISIS Iraq have negative impacts on security and human rights in the country because most of these groups were previously established based on sectarian factors and proximity to Iran. It also argues that while they are largely regarded as having had an essential role in defeating ISIS, their presence in a post-ISIS Iraq will threaten Iraq's stability.

Governments often supplement the regular military with paramilitaries and progovernment militias (PGMs). However, it is unclear what determines states’ selection of these auxiliary forces, and our understanding of how auxiliary force structures develop remains limited. The crucial difference between the two auxiliary types is their embeddedness in official structures. Paramilitaries are organized under the government to support/replace the regular military, whereas PGMs exist outside the state apparatus. Within a principal–agent framework, we argue that a state’s investment in a particular auxiliary force structure is shaped by available resources and capacity, accountability/deniability, and domestic threats. Our results based on quantitative analysis from 1981 to 2007 find that (a) state capacity is crucial for sustaining paramilitaries, but not PGMs; (b) PGMs, unlike paramilitaries, are more common in states involved in civil conflict; and (c) although both paramilitaries and PGMs are associated with regime instability, there is no significant difference between them in that context.

Violence is a common hazard for those working in emergency departments (EDs), yet it remains understudied. We describe a prospectively derived estimate of the prevalence of violence against health care workers among agitated patients in an ED. This was a secondary analysis of two prospective, observational studies of patients receiving care in a dedicated portion of the ED meant primarily to observe patients with intoxication. We collected detailed data for patients with agitation, defined as a score of +1 or higher using the altered mental status scale, an ordinal agitation scale from -4 (coma) to 0 (normal) to +4 (most agitated). Trained observers present in the ED 24/7 recorded whether each encounter involved verbal abuse, threat of violence, or a violent act against a health care worker. The primary outcome was the occurrence of assault as defined by state statute (threat of violence or violent act). We compare observed events to those formally reported to the hospital. From 17,873 encounters screened there were 4609 (25.8%) in which the patient had agitation. Alcohol or drug intoxication was present in 4108 (89.1%) encounters. The number of encounters with assault was 937 (20.3%, 95% confidence interval [CI] 19.1%-21.5%), which included 802 encounters (17.4%, 95% CI 16.3%-18.5%) with a threat of violence and 362 encounters (7.9%, 95% CI 7.1%-8.7%) with a violent act. Verbal abuse occurred in 1786 encounters (38.8%, 95% CI 37.3%-40.2%). Events were formally reported to the hospital in 9/1786 (0.5%) instances of verbal abuse and in 224/362 (61.9%) instances of a violent act. Verbal abuse, threats of assault, and violent acts occurred frequently in ED patients with agitation and were underreported.

Protecting civilians, civilian populations, civilian objects, and other persons who do not actively participate in hostilities is a cornerstone of International Humanitarian Law. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II constitute an international humanitarian legal framework for protecting civilians, civilian populations and civilian objects during armed conflicts. Facts have it that civilians, civilian populations, and persons who no longer take an active part in warfare are the ones who suffer the most from the effects of war. International Humanitarian law seeks to ensure that civilians and civilian populations are not subjected to attacks, actual violence, or threats of violence during armed conflicts of international and non-international nature. This Article analyzes the extent to which civilians, civilian populations, and civilian objects are protected by International Humanitarian Law whereby more specifically, the author analyzes relevant provisions of Geneva Convention IV Relative to the protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949, Additional Protocol I relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, of 1977, and Additional Protocol II relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, of 1977 and finally recommends inter alia that international humanitarian law should develop a new body of Law to protect innocent civilians following the emerging global war on terrorism owing to increased difficulties of distinguishing terrorists from civilians

AT THE TIME OF WRITING,1 hopes were high that a peace agreement would be signed between the Khartoum government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), bringing an end to a war in southern Sudan that has lasted on and off since independence in 1956. At the same time, there were worrying signs of growing conflict in the Darfur region in the west of the country, pitting forces based among the local Muslim peoples against pro-government militias known as the Janjaweed. The growth of this new conflict indicates that Sudan's civil war was never entirely a north-south or a Muslim-Christian struggle, but that it is a country-wide conflict that even incorporates other Muslim populations. The two main anti-government groupings in the Greater Darfur region are the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A). The Janjaweed militias are said to be largely of Chadian origin and finance themselves through plunder and pillage, reportedly enjoying implicit support from the government in Khartoum. The conflict has already left thousands of Darfurians killed, with an estimated 600,000 internally displaced and some 110,000 crossing as refugees into neighbouring Chad. As the government has denied access to most of the relief agencies operating in the country, the Darfur region is in effect sealed off from the outside world, leaving displaced people with little chance of receiving food aid and medical supplies. Despite its geographical remoteness, by late 2003 the crisis in Darfur gradually came to international attention. The grave deterioration of the situation during recent months has led Western supporters of the ongoing IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) negotiations between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A to acknowledge the seriousness of the escalating violence in Darfur. As the crisis is throwing a shadow over the peace talks in Naivasha in Kenya, the international community is expected to respond to the fighting. The insurrection in Darfur is gaining rapidly in coherence. In the light of the SPLM/A's bilateral talks with the government, several opposition movements are afraid that, once part of the transitional government, the

Examining militia relationships with the government and civilian populations can help scholars and policymakers better assess differences in militia form, function, and behavior. In this article, we examine the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU), a pro-government militia in the Philippines, to better understand how militia participants view insurgents, politicians, state security forces, and civilians based on their experiences serving in the group. We argue that analyzing these beliefs is critical to understanding how militias influence civilian security and the risk of political violence in conflict-contested areas, as well as the trajectory of civil conflict in states like the Philippines that rely on militias to perform core security functions. We base the analysis on surveys and interviews with CAFGU members and civilians living in the Eastern Visayas, a region of active and ongoing conflict, where insurgents and other armed militants advance their aims through acts of violence and terrorism. In doing so, we contribute to a growing literature on the role that militias play in civil war, as well as the implications that follow when states choose to arm “civilians” to aid in counterinsurgency and conflict suppression.

In nearly two-thirds of civil wars since 1989, governments have received support in their counterinsurgency operations from militias. Many scholars predict higher levels of violence in conflicts involving pro-government militias because governments are either unable or unwilling to control militias. This article challenges this view, arguing that governments can and do often control militia behavior in civil war. Governments make strategic decisions about whether to use violence against civilians, encouraging both regular military forces and militia forces to target civilians or restraining regular military forces and militia forces from attacking civilians. In some cases, however, government and militia behavior differs. When a militia recruits its members from the same constituency as the insurgents, the militia is less likely to target civilians, as doing so would mean attacking their own community. Statistical analyses, using new data on pro-government militia violence in civil wars from 1989 to 2010, support these arguments.

This article assesses the potential impact that a massive, organized, and sustained nonviolent Palestinian resistance movement can have on Israeli society. Based on the recognition of the growing success of nonviolent strategies internationally, the subjective Israeli perceptions due to a Jewish collective memory of victimhood, and the perceived efficacy of violent and nonviolent actions through the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, we conclude that such an unprecedented strategy has a strong likelihood of yielding an independent Palestinian state alongside a state of Israel. The nonviolent revolts against the long-ruling dictators in North Africa and the Middle East have spread like wildfire early in the second decade of the 21st century. At this time, many Palestinians have been considering how best to translate the strategies of such a spontaneous movement to meet their own needs. Clearly, there are some differences between what is in most cases a regime change with the massive support of the population, and the particular case of an uprising against the formidable military control of an Israeli government that has a large majority conditioned to support the suppression of an enemy's revolt. A realistic analysis of Israeli reactions to potential sustained Palestinian leadership and massive nonviolent struggle could be shaped mostly by the impact of three variables: a) recognition of the growing success of nonviolent strategies in the international context; b) subjective Israeli perceptions based on collective memory of victimhood and persecution in Jewish history, and c) the perceived efficacy of violent and nonviolent actions throughout the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly from the experiences of the first and second Intifada. In this article we briefly discuss a) and b) but are mainly focusing on c), a variable whose effect the Palestinians can still determine. In analyzing the latter, three key elements will be emphasized. First, Jewish-Is- raeli perceptions and stereotypes of past Palestinian resistance will be briefly discussed. Second, based on the lessons learned and opinions gathered, we assess the potential impact that nonviolent resistance can have on official and societal Israeli behavior. In the concluding section, looking into the future, we assess the likelihood that a nonviolent strategy will create an environment for an eventual sustainable resolution with a Palestinian state alongside a Jewish State of Israel. Means and ends have an important correlation. Moderation in Arab aims has occurred since the 19th Palestinian National Council in 1988, which established the Declaration of Independence recognizing the State of Israel in its pre-1967 borders. This moderation became regionalized with the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. Additionally, amid Palestinian reconciliation efforts, if Hamas genuinely joins the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) - at least implicitly agreeing to the Oslo Accords - there would be a larger Palestinian mandate to uphold a potential peace agreement with Israel. If such steps can be accompanied by a massive, long-term struggle legitimated by nonviolent means, then growing support at the international level and dissonance with unchanged (Israeli) official policy are likely to indirectly impact Israeli public opinion and strengthen the peace camp in Israel. This article builds on previous research conducted with colleagues from the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace (Hebrew University, Jerusalem) and Palestinian Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy (MEND, Jerusalem) between 2002-2004.1 It draws on an analysis of the Israeli reactions to the first and second Intifadas, including public opinion polls; content analysis of the media and coverage of specific events; interviews with activists from nonviolent grassroot organizations; focus groups (academics, media, students); and the personal experience of one of the authors, having been actively involved with this issue since the mid-1980s. …