The Origins of the 'Teheran Formula' on Polish Frontiers

Abstract

On the evening of 1 December 1943 at the Teheran Conference, Winston Churchill proposed to Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin that he be permitted to put to the Polish government-in-exile in London an agreed formula on Poland's post-war frontiers. This read that 'in principle . . . the home of the Polish state and nation should be between the so-called Curzon Line and the line of the Oder, including for Poland East Prussia and Oppeln'. Stalin agreed on condition that Russia obtained the 'Konigsberg area' of East Prussia. Roosevelt said nothing at this meeting, but he had told Stalin that morning that, although he could not pubicly commit himself, because of the 1944 presidential election, he would like to see the eastern border of Poland 'moved further to the west' and her western borders moved 'even to the River Oder'.1 The 'Teheran Formula' represented the acceptance by the Western allies of the 'Piast concept' of compensation, as advanced by Russia and her Polish supporters, over the 'Jagellon concept', adhered to by the Polish government and tacitly supported before Stalingrad by the Western powers. It was in the context of the allied victories at Stalingrad, El Alamein, and Tunis that the 'Big Three' were compelled to formulate and seek agreement upon conceptions of the post-war political order which would emerge upon the defeat of the Axis. The state frontiers and future government of Poland were related elements in that order. Acceptance of the 'Piast concept' of compensation and future frontiers was for Stalin a touchstone of 'friendliness to Russia' and a qualification for a ministerial portfolio in the future Poland.2 Adherence to the 'Jagellon concept' represented to Stalin the reverse.