The Origins of the Cultural Revolution . Volume 3, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961-1966 (review)

Abstract

Reviews 197© 1999 by University ofHawai'i Press Although Liu and Ma emphasize the role ofthe national college entrance exam in setting and maintaining high curriculum standards and student achievement, they keep coming back to the overriding effect ofchanges in social and political values in China. For centuries the entire Chinese governmental mechanism has been highly centralized, and this has been reflected in Chinese cultural attitudes concerning governance. There are no similar structural and cultural parallels in the North American context. But in the end, they argue that the vast socioeconomic and political inequality in China—affecting teachers and students, the quality ofschools, and the labor market—overwhelms the centralized nature of curriculum planning and standards: "Teaching facilities at the key-note schools at the national and provincial levels are likely first class and far above the requirement of the unified curriculum, comparable to international standards. While ordinary schools are far beyond die reach ofthe requirement ofthe national curriculum " (sic) (p. 169). And, "Therefore, the prioritization ofeducational resources created by the national curriculum in fact generates the prioritization of social interest" (p. 170). Therein lies the lesson of a centralized, unified national curriculum. In sum, this book delivers on its promise, although it would have benefited from a strong editorial hand. Vilma Seeberg Vilma Seeberg is an assistantprofessor ofinternational-intercultural education at Kent State University. Roderick MacFarquhar. The Origins ofthe Cultural Revolution. Volume 3, The Coming ofthe Cataclysm, 1961-1966. Oxford: Oxford University Press; New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. 733 pp. Hardcover $47.50, isbn 0-231-11082-0. Twenty-three years after the publication ofthe first volume ofthis trilogy on the origins ofthe Cultural Revolution, we now have the much-awaited final volume. Like the first two, this final installment is also meticulously researched and attractively produced. Indeed, the intervening years since the publication ofvolume 1 in 1974 have seen the release ofa torrent ofnew documents and publications in China, and MacFarquhar has taken full advantage ofthe newly available materials. Volume 3 has a total ofmore than 2,400 notes, compared with just un- 198 China Review International: Vol. 6, No. ?, Spring 1999 der 1,500 in volume 1 and more than 1,900 in volume 2. Each note in volume 3 also appears to be longer than the average note in the earlier volumes; many are, in fact, brief essays. In spite ofthe great length ofthis volume and of the trilogy as a whole, the central thesis ofvolume 3 is quite straightforward. MacFarquhar argues that two related developments, the failure ofthe Great Leap Forward and the vicissitudes in Sino-Soviet relations, can largely (though not fully) explain why Mao chose to turn on his heir apparent, state president Liu Shaoqi, and launch the Cultural Revolution. The colossal failure of the GLF plunged China into the worst famine in human history, pitted society against the state, fundamentally altered the attitudes ofChina's top leaders toward rural organizations, and sowed the seeds of suspicion in Mao toward his colleagues. Meanwhile, the retreat from Stalinism in the Soviet Union and the Sino-Soviet dispute caused Mao to worry about "a similar betrayal of the revolution in China" (p. 6). These concerns plus genuine political differences between Mao and Liu sealed Liu's fate. Mao's attack against Liu thus had both domestic and international dimensions. Indeed, when this volume, like the first two, is translated into Chinese, Chinese readers will find an image ofLiu Shaoqi that is considerably at variance with conventional wisdom in China. Radier than the number one capitalist roader that he was accused of being during the Cultural Revolution, Liu comes through these pages as Mao's lieutenant but especially a Party man who oversaw the Party machine and was bent on maintaining control. During the Socialist Education Movement that followed the Great Leap debacle, for example, Liu veered toward the extreme left and spearheaded a purge of rural Party members and cadres with ruthless thoroughness. In contrast, Mao was more tolerant ofgrassroots cadres and saw problems higher up. Seen in today's perspective, readers will likely have some sympathy for Mao's removal ofLiu, ifnot for the profound humiliation Liu was made to endure. The portrait...