The Origins and Consequences of Procedural Fairness

Abstract

In 1975 John Thibaut and Laurens Walker published their seminal monograph, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis.1 It involved a comparative empirical analysis of third-party procedures used in conflict resolution, such as adjudication, arbitration, and mediation. The research was concerned with a number of aspects of procedures, including fact-finding efficacy, but some of the most interesting findings involved subjective reactions to procedures: disputants (and uninvolved parties) were often as concerned with the fairness of the processes as with the outcome itself. This insight spawned substantial additional research on procedural fairness, in part because it is theoretically interesting but also because it would appear to have significant consequences for the design and implementation of mechanisms of dispute resolution. If disputants do not see procedures as fair, they will not accord them legitimacy, will avoid them if possible, and if forced to use them, will not readily accept the outcomes. Such matters are a major concern in debate about alternative dispute resolution in the legal system and in other settings as well.2 In The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice, Allan Lind and Tom