Abstract

Neither in Enlightenment philosophy nor in contemporary discussion is it clear what original position's legitimation-theoretical argument is all about. This characterizes a difficulty which increases exponentially when one try to establish a link between original position, John Rawls's thought experiment, and its classical equivalent, state of nature. With Enlightenment's contractualism Rawls's theory has highly modern premise of premiselessness in common. In original position's thought experiment, veil of ignorance takes up central position, at switchboard between normative and purposive-rational components. Rawls's overall arrangement of original position serves purpose of the reasoning leading to two principles of justice. But at a decisive point also Rawls's internal construction of original position departs so much from classical contractualism's state of nature, that it as such goes quite a way in meeting a justification-theoretical contractualism's tricky differentiation. Keywords: enlightenment philosophy; John Rawls; justice; original position; state of nature

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