The origin and outcome of an amicus brief in Kumho Tire v. Carmichael (1999).

Abstract

In the U.S. Supreme Court case of Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael (1999) the defendant/petitioner (Kumho) and amici for the defendant made assertions that juries have known tendencies to be improperly influenced by expert evidence. I and 17 colleagues who had knowledge of the jury research literature signed an amicus brief on the side of the plaintiff/respondent setting forth an opinion that the assertions were not supported by the bulk of empirical studies on jury behavior. We did so as independent professionals, not as representatives of an official organization, such as AP/LS. This introduction reports the origin and development of our brief, its legal status, and its uncertain impact on the case. Kumho arose out of a products liability case resulting from a 1988 minivan accident in Alabama that resulted in the death of one member of the Carmichael family and the injury of seven others. The Carmichael family sued the manufacturer of the tires in a Federal Court diversity case with claims involving the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, negligence/wantonness, and breach of warranty. For trial the plaintiffs offered a tire failure expert who was to testify that the tire that caused the accident was defective. However, after the expert was deposed, the defendant, Samyang Tire (subsequently acquired by Kumho), field a motion to have his testimony excluded under F.R.E. 702 (Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 1996). The defendant argued that the testimony was unscientific and unreliable and did not meet the standards set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993). Plaintiffs argued that the testimony was technical and experientially based, not scientific evidence, and therefore it was not subject to Daubert scrutiny. Following a hearing, the judge excluded the testimony, ruling that the expert's methodology and opinions drawn from them did not meet the general standards set forth in Daubert. In a