The Origin and Consequences of Military Involvement in Defense and Foreign Policy

Abstract

Abstract The purpose of this study is to analyze the origins of military involvement in domestic politics as well as the consequences of such involvement for foreign and defense policies. The preponderance of military regimes notwithstanding (in 1968, for instance, there were 40 states with military men as heads of government), there has been confusion and controversy over the consequences, in the politics of military involvement, of domestic attributes (societal fragmentation, economic development, power capability) and of the international environment (interstate threat and rivalry, super power-client relationship, regional tension). Moreover, we lack a systematic understanding of the impacts of military influence on foreign policy behavior. Military influence (M.I.) in domestic politics was operationalized by five indicators: military coups, military participation ratio (soldier/population), defense expenditure as a proportion of total governmental revenue, the duration of military services required, and the political strength rating of military elite. These indicators were correlated with approximately 60 variables across some 150 nations (ca. 1970). Some of the preliminary findings are as follows: (1) The measures of domestic segmentation and violence have positive correlations with M.I. (2) The indicators of wealth and size of a state bear little linear correlation with M.I. due to complex, curvilinear relationships. (3) The super power-client relationships are positively associated with M.I. In particular, the correlations are stronger between the military coups, on one hand, and the military and economic ties with the U.S.A. on the other. (4) Countries with a strong political rating of the military tend to spend a higher proportion of their governmental revenues for defense. (5) Lastly, there are positive (though weak) correlations between M.I. and pro-Chinese behavior in the U.N. General Assembly. The correlational analysis was supplemented with an exploratory time-series analysis of defense expenditure and behavior in the U.N. General Assembly (1950–1971). In both cases, contrary to popular expectations, it turned out that the military coups are not necessarily followed by dramatic changes in these patterns. The research reported here has demonstrated that there is considerable merit in analyzing the M.I. as an important intervening variable between internal-external environment and the foreign policy output of a country. Even this preliminary analysis has revealed that foreign policy behavior is a complex phenomenon and research on it should entail designs and methods that go beyond simple, linear models. Hence the priorities of our future research lie in the following areas: (1) specification of a complex, dynamic model of military involvement in foreign policy; (2) development of more reliable indicators of military influence; and (3) compilation of more time-series data.