Abstract

The interaction of the EU institutions is aimed at aggregating a wide range of interests and ensuring the widest possible (preferably consensual) support for the policy. However, game theory reveals that the ordinary legislative procedure breeds competition between two co-legislators - the Council and the European Parliament - that seek to reflect their preferences within the legislative draft. This study attempts to assess the development of cooperative practices in the ordinary legislative procedure (since its establishment under the name “codecision procedure”) and the importance of these practices for the effectiveness of the legislative process. The development of cooperative practices is illustrated by three examples. First, the transformation of the rules of the third reading. Second, peculiarities of the Conciliation Committee functioning. Third, the development of trialogues and their main features. According to the results of the study, the author concluded that a set of cooperative practices between the EU Council and the European Parliament has been formed within the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure which is structured in a way that encourages co-legislators to cooperate and engage in intensive inter-institutional negotiations that complement the negotiations within each of the institutions. The reason for this is that the ordinary legislative procedure has a complex system of checks and balances. This allows a number of actors to block or delay the decision-making process. Complex procedure literally forces the EU institutions to come to a compromise. The ordinary legislative procedure as it was set out in the Treaties was supplemented by number of cooperative practices based on political agreements, which enhance a more effective interaction between institutions. The need to ensure the support of all (the vast majority) of the Member States in the Council and key political groups in the European Parliament prompts to take into account the whole spectrum of interests. As a result, it ensures high quality of decision-making process and high quality of governance.

Highlights

  • Game theory reveals that the ordinary legislative procedure breeds competition between two co-legislators – the Council and the European Parliament – that seek to reflect their preferences within the legislative draft

  • This study attempts to assess the development of cooperative practices in the ordinary legislative procedure and the importance of these practices for the effectiveness of the legislative process

  • According to the results of the study, the author concluded that a set of cooperative practices between the EU Council and the European Parliament has been formed within the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure which is structured in a way that encourages co-legislators to cooperate and engage in intensive inter-institutional negotiations that complement the negotiations within each of the institutions

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Summary

Обычная законодательная процедура в ЕС как пример кооперативных практик

Московский государственный институт международных отношений МИД России; Институт Европы РАН. В то же время, с точки зрения теории игр, обычная законодательная процедура предполагает конкуренцию двух созаконодателей – Совета ЕС и Европарламента – за то, чтобы отразить в тексте закона свои предпочтения. По результатам исследования сделан вывод, что в рамках обычной законодательной процедуры сформировался набор кооперативных практик взаимодействия Совета ЕС и Европарламента. Ключевые слова: Европейский союз, процедуры принятия решений, обычная законодательная процедура, триалоги. Ключевые аспекты формирования и функционирования институтов ЕС, в частности процедуры принятия решений, сконструированы таким образом, чтобы агрегировать широкий спектр интересов и обеспечить поддержку проводимой политики (желательно консенсусную). Вто же время некоторые процедуры принятия решений, прежде всего обычная законодательная процедура, выстроены на противопоставлении двух созаконодателей. В настоящей работе предпринята попытка оценить развитие кооперативных практик в обычной законодательной процедуре ЕС (процедура совместного принятия решений) и показать значение этих практик для эффективности законодательного процесса.

ВТОРОЕ ЧТЕНИЕ
Согласительный комитет как площадка взаимодействия Совета ЕС и Европарламента
Full Text
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