The Ordinary Legislative Procedure in a Post-Brexit EU: The Case of Social Europe

Paul Copeland

doi:10.17645/pag.v9i1.3704

Abstract

This article assesses the political and power dynamics of the Ordinarily Legislative Procedure (OLP) in social Europe and the likely impact of the UK’s departure in the field for future integration. It provides a detailed analysis of the OLP in social Europe during two recent periods of integration in the field—the first Barroso Commission (2004–2009) and the Juncker Commission (2014–2019). It finds the dynamics of the OLP have shifted from intergovernmental deadlock during the Barroso Commission to the characteristics of a new intergovernmental core state power during the Juncker Commission, even though the policy area is not a core state power <em>per se</em>. Despite the use of qualified majority voting policy agreements can only be achieved when there is near unanimity support in the Council, the Commission remains a neutral broker, and the Parliament shifts its position to that of the Council. As a result, continued opposition to integration in social Europe by Northern and Eastern Members means the removal of UK political agency will have only a marginal impact on the slow and piecemeal approach to integration in the field.

Highlights

The ordinary legislative procedure (OLP), or the Community Method as it is more commonly referred to, covers approximately 72% of all subject areas for which the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union provides for legislative procedures
This article has focussed on two research questions: What are the political and power dynamics of the Social Community Method (SCM)? And what is the likely impact of the UK’s departure on the future of the SCM? Analysing the political and power dynamics of the SCM reveals the shift from intergovernmental deadlock during the first Barroso Commission to the features of a new intergovernmental core state power during the Juncker Commission, even though the field is not a core state power per se
The deadlock of the Barroso Commission can be accounted for by the inability of the Parliament to agree with the Council

Summary

Introduction

The ordinary legislative procedure (OLP), or the Community Method as it is more commonly referred to, covers approximately 72% of all subject areas for which the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union provides for legislative procedures. Within core state powers decisions are controlled and steered by intergovernmentalism owing to their national sensitivity, with the Commission and the Parliament often marginalised This has given rise to the new intergovernmentalism whereby the process of European integration has deepened, but paradoxically, decision-making remains in the hands of the Council (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015). In response to these two questions, this article argues that the SCM has shifted from intergovernmental deadlock during the first Barroso Commission (2004–2009) to featuring the characteristics of a core state power of the new intergovernmentalism during the Juncker Commission (2014–2019), even though the SCM is not a core state power per se This shift is attributed to the EU’s attempt to improve its negative image in the wake of the Eurozone crisis rather than a decline in UK political agency.

The Social Community Method as New Intergovernmentalism

Findings

Conclusion