Abstract
Abstract Some epistemologists appear to maintain that the folk can serve as a source of dialectical advantage in debates between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how. The common assumption seems to be that the philosophical account that best accords with the folk concept has a dialectical advantage over its competitors such that it ought to enjoy a strong (though defeasible) presumption in its favor. Work in experimental philosophy on the folk concept has thus far been rather conflicted, with some reporting results suggesting that the concept is intellectualist and others that it is anti-intellectualist. This chapter presents results in line with the claim that the folk concept is an epistemological hybrid, embodying both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist factors.
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