Abstract
If a seller with many units sells all units using separate auctions at the same time, the random match among buyers and units will create allocation inefficiency. We show that with an option of posted price selling before the start of auctions, it is possible that in the equilibrium only some high valuation buyers want to buy through posted price selling. Thus, some high valuation buyers are screened out before the random match in auctions. The seller gets higher expected revenue and more units are allocated to high valuation buyers. The model may shed some light on the option of posted price selling for online auction markets.
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