Abstract
This paper investigates the question of the optimal management of renewable resources jointly owned by two states. A dynamic model of fisheries is combined with Nash's theory of two-person co-operative games. Conflicts in the management strategies of the two states arising from differences in perceptions of the social rate of discount, fishing effort costs, and consumer preferences are examined. Cases are considered in which the two partners can and cannot make side or transfer payments to one another. It is concluded that side payments greatly ease the resolution of resource management conflicts. La gestion optimale de ressour-ces renouvelables trans-nationales. Ce memoire examine le problmy renewable resources / 357 should be extended to cover transboundary resources involving several countries. That however, would be the subject of another paper.
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