Abstract
This paper shows that the Mirrlees-Seade conditions of agent monotonicity and noninferiority of leisure imply the positivity of the optimal marginal income tax rate in Sheshinski's model of linear income taxation as well as in the general model. The optimal marginal tax rate is bounded above by the Rawlsian rate, which in turn is bounded by the revenue-maximizing rate. The optimal marginal tax rate may be arbitrarily close to the Rawlsian rate. However, the optimal marginal tax rate is bounded away from the revenue-maximizing rate whenever the individual with the lowest ability works.
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