Abstract
This paper develops a model of union-firm bargaining in which union membership is determined with the wage through the impact of management opposition to unionization. Empirical evidence, both for the United States and the United Kingdom, suggests that management opposition to unions is an important determinant of union membership necessary for the union to be able to obtain a wage mark-up and the authors analyze how this critical level varies with the parameters of the model, such as the competitive wage and the firm's product market conditions. Copyright 1993 by Royal Economic Society.
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