The open question argument

Abstract

The future historian of “thought and expression” in the twentieth century will no doubt record with some amusement the ingenious trick, which … is the naturalistic fallacy. (Frankena 1939: 464) Why, then, isn't Moore's argument a mere period piece? How ever readily we now reject as antiquated his views in semantics and epistemology, it seems impossible to deny that Moore was on to something. (Darwall et al. 1992: 116) CHAPTER AIMS To introduce the open question argument (OQA) and how it relates to the naturalistic fallacy. To explain a number of problems with the OQA. To show how the OQA has shaped the metaethical landscape. Introduction Some things seem to resist definition. How might we define “person”, “politics”, “feminism”, “beauty”, “music”, “yellow” or “society”? Being told that a person is just H 15750 N 310 O 6500 C 2250 Ca 63 P 48 K 15 S 15 Na 10 Cl 6 Mg 3 Fe 1 or that music is just some combination of sound frequencies, leaves us unconvinced. Writing about how to define “yellow”, G. E. Moore says: We may try to define it by describing its physical equivalent; we may state what kind of light-vibrations must stimulate the normal eye, in order that we may perceive it. But a moment's reflection is sufficient to [show] that those light-vibrations are not themselves what we mean by yellow. (Moore [1903] 1993: 62, emphasis added) The question at the heart of this chapter is whether we think that “good” also resists definition.