Abstract

Abstract In his recent Immaterialism, Graham Harman develops a theory of social objects based on his object-oriented ontology. Whereas some of the more mainstream theories in the humanities would dissolve such objects into their material constituents or their various effects on others, object-oriented social theory theorizes them as inert, resilient entities with a private reality that exceeds their components and actions. Harman’s theory focuses on what social entities are qua objects, and consequently says little about their specificity as social objects. A more complete social theory would also outline how human existence is to be understood in relation to a social world comprised of discrete and inert entities, as opposed to, for example, far more continuous material fields or networks of associations. We argue that an unexpected yet solid candidate for such an extension of object-oriented social theory already exists in Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of practico-inert being and group formation. We first outline Harman’s and Sartre’s respective ontologies of social objects, and then discuss how their many complementarities make the latter a suitable extension of the former.

Highlights

  • In his recent Immaterialism, Graham Harman develops a theory of social objects based on his object-oriented ontology

  • We argue that an unexpected yet solid candidate for such an extension of object-oriented social theory already exists in Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of practico-inert being and group formation

  • Whereas Harman primarily focuses on the social object qua social object, Sartre is mostly interested in the social object qua social object

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Summary

The reality of social objects

One of the most remarkable events in recent continental philosophy is the emergence of Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology (OOO). Because Sartre is associated with phenomenology, which might not always sit well with OOO.[2] Second, because Sartre is an existentialist, and Immaterialism explicitly sneers at existentialism for its alleged one-sided focus on human subjects.[3] because most continental philosophers have dismissed Sartre as an outdated thinker who would have been surpassed (or even refuted) by Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and others These possible objections are all connected to the image of Sartre as putting human beings at the center and steering wheel of reality.[4] This image is undeserved, because, as we will demonstrate, Sartre offers a profoundly object-oriented account of our engagements with social objects.[5]. Things become more ambiguous when we ask if, for example, ecosystems and animal species that are significantly affected by human activity are social objects, so that a clear definition of the term becomes instructive

Harman’s withdrawn objects
The resilience of social objects
Sartre and the practico-inert
The formation of social objects
Object-oriented inertia
Conclusion
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