The Ontological Constitution of Bounding-Judging in the Phenomenological Epistemology of von Bertalanffy's General System Theory

Abstract

An analysis of the current presentation of boundary judgments in the Critical Systems literature highlights a general result: that the activity of bounding has been, implicitly or explicitly, considered as an epistemological issue. By arguing that knowledge is not produced singularly by bounding, the paper informs this general result. This, in turn, informs other results, which have emerged in current understanding. In particular, the paper argues (a) the reason why knowledge indeed never attains the status of "objective or right" knowledge, (b) how critique is dependent on some positing of knowledge, and (c) the exact place where critique is actioned. von Bertalanffy's attempted systems epistemology is considered at length because it explains and informs the epistemological conclusions seen to have been drawn in the current Critical Systems literature. von Bertalanffy's attempt requires the support of Husserlian phenomenology, especially Sartre's understanding of it. This requires an in-depth discussion of the phenomenological understanding of consciousness. Since the conclusions stem from von Bertalanffy, the paper reconsiders the status of General System Theory in Critical Systems Thinking.